

AD/RR 25X1A9a

19 December 1951

History of the Study on the Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Support a General War

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1. On 1 October 1951, Messrs. Millikan and [REDACTED] discussed with the JIG (Red Team) the appropriate form for a letter to the IAC, recommending that this study be undertaken.
2. On 3 October 1951, Mr. Millikan announced at the ORR staff meeting that this study was about to be launched. A tentative deadline of 2 February 1952 was set for the entire project.
3. On 24 October 1951, three weeks after initial discussions, JIGM-628 was sent to the IAC. This memorandum states that a study covering a war beginning 1 July 1952 "should be completed by 1 February 1952." JIGM-628 was transmitted by James Q. Reber to the IAC on 29 October 1951 with the recommendation that the study "be undertaken through the Economic Intelligence Committees."
4. On 24 October 1951, the JIG (Red Team) sent JIGM-277 to Army, Air Force, and Navy. This document requests Service intelligence agencies to estimate wartime and peacetime military requirements in terms of certain basic materials. No deadline is mentioned. As becomes apparent from developments outlined below, the military accepted JIGM-277 as the Bible for its part of the study and refused to deviate in any way from the format laid down without "orders" to do so from the JIG.
5. On 1 November 1951, one month after initial discussions, the IAC approved the project and laid it on the EIC (see IAC-M-50). No mention is made in the minutes of a deadline.
6. On 6 November 1951, an ad hoc meeting of the EIC was held. A working group was set up to administer the study. At the EIC meeting, Captain Heberton pointed out that, concomitantly with the EIC study, the JLPG would be engaged in partial war-gaming. First, JLPG would test the logistical capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to conduct jointly the set of campaigns which the Bloc is currently considered capable of conducting separately. Revisions in campaigns would then be made as required. Second, JLPG would estimate attrition rates of military end-items incurred by the Bloc in conducting these campaigns. JLPG was expected to complete the first job by 1 December, the second by 1 January.

7. On 8 November 1951, EC prepared the first draft of an outline for the study and distributed it to members of the Working Group.

8. Around 12 November 1951, the draft outline was discussed with ORR Division Chiefs.

9. On 14 and 15 November 1951, the Working Group met to discuss and revise the draft outline. ORR was requested to compile a definitive list of industries to be included in the study. Military representatives pointed out that no changes in the study as outlined in JIGM-277 could be made without action by the JIG.

10. Between 16 and 24 November 1951, the project was being laid on the Air Force and Navy by their right hands without consulting their left hands, i.e., their representatives on the EIC Working Group. Air Force was given a deadline of 20 November to complete the project. It proved to be impossible to rescind these orders through informal requests to the Air Force and Navy from the EIC secretariat.

11. Meanwhile, EC was meeting with ORR Division and Branch Chiefs to settle on a definitive outline for the study. A revised outline was prepared for consideration by the Working Group.

12. On 26 November 1951, the Working Group met. Military representatives again stated that the JIG would have to take formal action to rescind JIGM-277 if any changes were to be made in form or content of the study as outlined therein. The military representatives would not take responsibility for drafting the outline for the military sector or for drawing up a list of military end-items. These jobs were delegated to ORR. ORR was instructed to prepare a final outline and to forward it to the JIG with the recommendation that it replace JIGM-277.

13. Between 27 November and 3 December 1951, EC drafted a final outline. It was forwarded to the JIG on 3 December, one month after the project was laid on by the IAC and two months after 25X4492a1 discussions. At this time, Captain Heberton informed [REDACTED] that JIG had made no progress in its two jobs and had given up on both. Instead, each of the Services would be asked to compute attrition rates for appropriate military end-items. No tests of logistical feasibility of Soviet campaigns were to be conducted.

14. At some time between 4 and 6 December, the JIG Red Team met with military representatives to discuss whether they could compute attrition rates. Later hearsay reports suggest that this meeting ended in complete confusion, with the military prepared, and indeed happy, to abandon the whole project.

15. On 7 December, that memorable date, I met with the JIG Red Team and military representatives in an attempt to revive the apparent corpse. Two trains of military thought emerged. First, Col. Lauro (Air Force Estimates Branch) and John Kullgren insisted that nothing could be done on hot war military consumption until after 1 February. Hence the study should be done in two phases: the first to cover cold war capabilities, a la IM-181; the second to cover hot war capabilities. Second, strong sentiment was expressed by John Kullgren (seconded initially by Comdr. Deane, though his support was later withdrawn) to limit the entire study to a literal revision of IM-181, even as regards format and items covered. After some considerable struggle, this suggestion was beaten down. It was agreed to push ahead on the study as newly conceived and make the best of it possible.

16. Between 8 and 10 December, EC made further revisions in the outline to conform with decisions at the above meeting.

17. On 11 December, The Working Group met and approved the revisions. In addition, it was decided to extend deadlines as follows: (1) cold war phase will be completed by 24 March 1952, with contributions due on 3 March 1952; (2) hot war phase will be completed by 19 May 1952, with contributions due on 14 April 1952.

18. The following are significant synopses:

- a. For the entire study of economic capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to support a general war beginning 1 July 1952, the deadline has been postponed by about three and a half months.
- b. The delay between initial discussions and laying on of the project by IAC was one month.
- c. The delay between laying on by the IAC and approval of a working outline was one and a third months.
- d. Hence two thirds of the postponement of deadline can be, in a sense, attributed to difficulties in getting this project laid on.

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